Objectivity, Ambiguity, and Theory Choice by Marcoci, Alexandru & Nguyen, James
Objectivity, Ambiguity, and Theory Choice∗
Alexandru Marcoci† James Nguyen‡
Forthcoming in Erkenntnis
Abstract
Kuhn argued that scientific theory choice is, in some sense, a rational
matter, but one that is not fully determined by shared objective scientific
virtues like accuracy, simplicity, and scope. Okasha imports Arrow’s impossi-
bility theorem into the context of theory choice to show that rather than not
fully determining theory choice, these virtues cannot determine it at all. If
Okasha is right, then there is no function (satisfying certain desirable condi-
tions) from ‘preference’ rankings supplied by scientific virtues over competing
theories (or models, or hypotheses) to a single all-things-considered ranking.
This threatens the rationality of science. In this paper we show that if Kuhn’s
claims about the role that subjective elements play in theory choice are taken
seriously, then the threat dissolves.
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1 Introduction
Suppose a scientist is faced with a collection of competing scientific theories, mod-
els or hypotheses. Moreover, suppose that she cares about a number of distinct
scientific virtues – accuracy, simplicity, and scope for example. How is the scientist
to rationally choose the ‘best’ alternative, all-things-considered? One would like to
think that, whatever the details of how the choice is made, some rational procedure
is followed to make it.
According to Kuhn (1972), scientists faced with such a choice, even if they
agreed about which theoretical virtues should guide their choice, could still ratio-
nally disagree about which is the ‘all-things-considered’ best competing theory. In
this sense, there is no ‘unique algorithm’ that takes how well theories fare according
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to the scientific virtues and delivers a ‘winner’. This is not to say that theory choice
is ‘a matter of mob psychology’ (Lakatos, 1970, p. 178), but rather that the shared
and objective virtues do not determine by themselves a winner, or unique ranking
of the theories.
Okasha (2011) uses the formal framework of social choice theory to argue that,
rather than there being no unique algorithm for using the objective information
supplied by the scientific virtues to rationally choose the best theory, there is no
such algorithm whatsoever: ‘Where Kuhn saw an embarrassment of riches, Arrow
tells us that there is nothing at all’ (Okasha, 2011, p. 93). If theory choice were
purely an objective matter, then this would be a significant problem. But Okasha
fails to pay attention to Kuhn’s claims about the subjective elements involved in
theory choice; in particular, the role scientists play in disambiguating the scientific
virtues. We demonstrate how to do this in the framework Okasha proposes, and
show via simulation that this blunts the threat posed significantly.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we outline Okasha’s argument. Section
3 discusses subjective elements involved in the context of theory choice, i.e. the
ambiguity of scientific virtues. In Section 4 we argue that Okasha’s proposed way
of dealing with this in the social choice framework is unsatisfactory. In Section
5 we propose an alternative treatment which we then feed into the definition of
rationality, in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we demonstrate that with this in
place, the impossibility result can be bypassed. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the
subjectivity involved in disambiguating scientific virtues turns out to be a good
thing.
2 Okasha’s challenge
Okasha employs a simple but persuasive argumentative strategy. Let V be a finite
set of m scientific virtues, and T a finite set n of competing theories. Each scientific
virtue i ∈ V provides an ordinal ranking of the elements of T, from most to least
virtuous according to i. These rankings are transitive, reflexive, and complete binary
relations.1 When theory x is preferred to theory y by virtue i we write y ≺i x. A
theory choice situation is a profile of rankings of theories by virtues, where a profile
is an ordered tuple 〈≺1, ...,≺m〉 for virtues 1 through m. A theory choice function
maps profiles to an all-things-considered binary relation  defined over T. A theory
x is strictly preferred (all-things-considered) to theory y, i.e. y ≺ x if and only if
y  x and it’s not the case that x  y.
What requirements should we impose on a rational theory choice function?
Okasha (2011, pp. 92-93) argues that the Arrovian conditions on preference ag-
gregation have clear analogues in the context of theory choice. Unrestricted domain
(UD) requires that a theory choice function be applicable irrespective of how the-
ories are ranked by virtues. Weak Pareto (WP) requires that, for all x, y ∈ T, if
x is ranked above y according to every virtue, then x should be ranked above y
all-things-considered. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) requires that
1In this paper we restrict our focus to strict rankings associated with scientific virtues for
simplicity. Where relevant our approach can be extended to accommodate rankings allowing for
ties. This is of no conceptual importance.
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the all-things-considered relation between two theories takes into account only how
those two theories are ranked by the scientific virtues, i.e. the overall comparison
between the two be insensitive to how virtues rank them with respect to a third
theory. Non-Dictatorship (ND) demands that there is no virtue i such that for
every pair of alternatives x, y ∈ T, whenever i prefers x to y, x is ranked above
y all-things-considered. Finally, Overall Rationality (OR) demands that a theory
choice function deliver a transitive, complete ranking for every element in its do-
main.2 With theories replacing social alternatives, and scientific virtues replacing
voters, it is immediate to see that Arrow’s (1951) impossibility result applies. In
other words, there is no theory choice function that satisfies UD, WP, IIA, ND
and OR. Okasha’s challenge is, that assuming rational theory choice requires the
existence of such a function, rational theory choice is impossible.
‘If we agree that U, P, N, and I are conditions on reasonable theory
choice, then it is obvious that an Arrovian impossibility result applies.
So long as there are at least three alternative theories, there exists no
theory choice rule that satisfies all four conditions. This spells bad news
for the possibility of making ‘rational’ theory choices’ (Okasha, 2011, p.
93).3
Okasha’s argument has generated much discussion. Morreau (2014, 2015) sug-
gest restricting UD. Rizza (2013) and Stegenga (2015) follow up on Okasha’s (2011)
own suggestion of enriching the informational basis of scientific virtues by provid-
ing a common cardinal scale allowing for inter-virtue comparisons (thereby dropping
IIA). Whether all scientific virtues provide such information is questionable as dis-
cussed in Okasha’s (2015) response to Stegenga. Relatedly, Gaertner and Wüthrich
(2016) suggest imposing a cardinality via a scoring rule in a way that captures the
spirit of IIA in a cardinal framework. Bradley (forthcoming) suggests that ratio-
nality only requires ruling out certain alternatives, not a transitive and complete
ranking of theories.
In contrast to these authors, rather than attempting to reformulate the con-
ditions, our focus is on one of Okasha’s modelling assumptions. Once profiles of
competing theories ranked by virtues are provided, for the purposes of this paper
we can grant that Okasha’s result kicks in. What we question instead is whether
or not the virtues provide such rankings. If theory choice were perfectly objective
then this would be a natural assumption to make. But if Kuhn is correct, then
rational theory choice involves subjective elements as well. In particular, at least
for our current purposes, subjective elements are required to disambiguate between
different ways the same virtue would evaluate competing theories. And if virtues
are ambiguous in the sense to be outlined in Section 3, then particular theory choice
situations do not supply a unique profile with which to augment a theory choice
2Note that this condition is usually build into the definition of an aggregation function. In this
paper we include it as a separate condition in light of the fact that we are interested in aggregation
functions that map to intransitive/incomplete binary relations. We will use the term ‘intransitive’
to refer to the intransitivty of the entire binary relation (), note that this is compatible with ≺
being transitive.
3Note that his ‘U’ is our ‘UD’; his ‘P’ our ‘WP’; his ‘N’ our ‘ND’; his ‘I’ our ‘IIA’; and where
he assumes our OR in the definition of a theory choice rule we pull it out as a further condition.
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function. And as we demonstrate in Section 7, if enough virtues are assumed am-
biguous to a certain extent, the threat posed by Okasha’s argument dissolves.
3 Subjectivity and Ambiguity
Kuhn (1972) goes at great lengths to explain the impact of subjective as well as
objective factors in his model of theory change. According to Kuhn, the way scien-
tists evaluate the adequacy of scientific theories is guided by the scientific virtues.
These form a shared and, in Kuhn’s view, objective list of adequacy conditions ac-
cording to which every scientist evaluates every theory. Therefore when confronted
with a list of competing theories, scientists will produce rankings of these theories
according to the virtues taken into consideration.
Prima facie, each scientific virtue i supplies a unique preference ranking ≺i. So
for a given theory choice situation, a scientist who starts the aggregation procedure
is faced with one and only one profile from which to generate an all-things-considered
ranking. This is a natural assumption to make in the context of orthodox social
choice theory, but it fails to capture the appropriate notion of ambiguity of scientific
virtues. Kuhn claims that:
‘Individually the [virtues] are imprecise: individuals may legitimately
differ about their application to concrete cases’ (1972, p. 357)
and relatedly:
‘Individuals must then still choose and be guided by the [virtues] when
they [choose]. For that purpose, however, each must first flesh [them]
out ... and each will do so in a somewhat different way’ (1972, p. 364).
This is the sense in which subjective elements, according to Kuhn, enter into
the way scientists choose among competing theories, models or hypotheses.4 For
example, two scientists may disagree with respect to how to interpret ‘simplicity’.
Suppose the competitors are hypotheses in the form of mathematical equations,
polynomials for instance. One scientist might believe that equation x is simpler
than equation y if and only if x contains strictly fewer parameters than y. An-
other might use the order (the largest exponent) of the equations as their guide
to simplicity. A third might use the computational labour required to generate
solutions to the equations). Alternatively, suppose the competing theories consist
of qualitative statements that consist of equal numbers of universally quantified
conjunctions. One way of comparing them with respect to accuracy would be to
4There is another natural way of thinking about the subjectivity involved in choosing be-
tween competing scientific theories (Kuhn, 1972, p. 358). When trying to arrive at an all-things-
considered ranking of the theories presented with, different scientists may assign different weights
to how much the virtues ‘count’ for the final ranking. For instance, radical empiricists will most
likely assign a very high importance to accuracy to the detriment of all the other virtues, whereas
others might be interested in a mix of accuracy and simplicity. So, although the virtues form a
common template according to which theories are being evaluated, different scientists may dis-
agree to how important some of them are. This second sense in which subjectivity appears in the
context of theory choice raises interesting problems, but we will not address it in this paper.
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simply count the number of strictly true conjuncts. Another would be to compare
the absolute number of falsifying instances (by summing the number of falsifiers
across the conjunction). These may plausibly deliver different results. Irrespective
of the different reasons for taking virtues to be ambiguous, Kuhn believes that:
‘The considerable effectiveness of [scientific virtues] does not . . . depend
on their being sufficiently articulated to dictate the choice of each indi-
vidual who subscribes to them’ (1972, p. 362).
Therefore, although the virtues according to which decisions are being made are
objective and shared by every member of a particular scientific community, the way
each virtue ranks theories is not a matter of fact. There are three senses in which
this could be the case, mapping to three different ways of understanding the “con-
crete cases" Kuhn talks about. First, the same scientist is free to adopt a different
interpretation in different theory choice scenarios (i.e. where choosing among differ-
ent sets of competing theories, models, or hypotheses). Second, the same scientist
is free to adopt a different interpretation in different theory application scenarios
(i.e. where the theories in question are fixed, but applied to different target sys-
tems). In some of these scenarios she may interpret simplicity in one way (number
of parameters say), and in another she may adopt a different interpretation (com-
putational labour required to make predictions say). In other words, there is no
threat of irrationality stemming from this kind of inter-context inconsistency with
respect to the interpretation of a virtue.
But more significantly from our current perspective, even in a particular theory
choice scenario, where the pertinent virtues, competitors, and application are fixed,
different scientists may legitimately disagree about how to interpret each scientific
virtue in that context. Such different interpretations can presumably lead to differ-
ent orderings of theories, and therefore different profiles with respect to which to
apply an aggregation procedure. In this sense, even in a particular theory choice
context, there is no ‘matter of fact’ with respect to how a scientific virtue orders the
competing theories. Different rankings can be equally ‘correct’, and thus a scientific
virtue can be ambiguous between them. To explain why someone ranks theories
in a particular context according to simplicity, is a question for the sociologist and
psychologist, thinks Kuhn, and not for the analytical philosopher of science.
So, to sum up. In particular theory choice contexts, scientific virtues can be
ambiguous across multiple orderings of the competitors. Different sociological and
psychological facts about the scientists involved can legitimately lead them to dis-
ambiguate a virtue in a different manner. Ambiguity thus allows for some freedom
of movement between different rankings. How much freedom of movement differs
from context to context and also depends on the subjective reasons guiding indi-
vidual scientists towards particular rankings. In this paper we model this space
of movement and investigate the impact this extra dimension of theory choice has
on the notion of scientific rationality and ultimately on bypassing the impossibility
Okasha discusses.
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4 Okasha’s treatment
Okasha claims that ‘[d]isambiguation can always be carried out by sub-dividing an
ambiguous [virtue]’ (2011, p. 85) into non-ambiguous distinct preference rankings,
each of which are included in the profile of rankings that a theory choice function
takes as an argument. So if, for example, simplicity is ambiguous between two
distinct rankings ≺si and ≺si′ , then both are included in the profile.
This approach is unsatisfactory as it does not capture Kuhn’s claims about
legitimate disagreement with respect to how virtues apply to concrete cases. Rather
than modelling ≺si and ≺si′ as competing disambiguations of simplicity, Okasha’s
approach treats them as being compatible alternatives. So multiple scientists who
disagreed with respect to how to disambiguate simplicity in a concrete instance of
theory choice would be treated as agreeing that each disambiguation should be used
for the purpose of generating an all-things-considered ranking. Okasha’s approach
thus multiplies the objective element of theory choice – an additional virtue for each
disambiguation of a virtue – rather than recognising Kuhn’s claim that there is a
subjective element involved in turning these less than fully articulated notions into
ones that can guide choice.
We therefore believe that an alternative account of ambiguity in theory choice
is worth pursuing. We propose such an account below and argue that it formally
captures the idea that virtues are ambiguous in Kuhn’s sense, thus capturing the
subjective element involved in theory choice, and that it blunts the threat posed by
Okasha’s argument.
5 A Kuhnian construal of ambiguity
We have argued that on Kuhn’s construal of theory choice scientific virtues cannot
provide an objective (or in any sense ‘true’) ordering of theories. Therefore, given
their ambiguity scientists can have some freedom of movement in between different
orderings of the same set of theories under the same virtue. How different can two
rankings be so that a scientist treats them as being different disambiguations of the
same virtue? This is sensitive to how many different ways there are to rank the
alternatives, which is sensitive to the size of the choice set under consideration. For
n alternatives, there are n! distinct (strict) rankings over them. So, with respect to
our example of choosing between T = {x, y, z}, there are 6 possible rankings over
T. A virtue that specified a precise ranking would be unambiguous. A virtue which
was maximally ambiguous between all of these 6 would be uninformative. Between
these two extremes, there are multiple ways of setting a sensible threshold.
One obvious way to proceed is to define a notion of ‘closeness’ between two
rankings in terms of the number of their pairwise disagreements. Two rankings are
‘close’, for instance, if and only if they differ on only one pair of alternatives. To
understand this notion of ‘closeness’ better assume T = {x, y, z, u, v} and consider
the four rankings which are close to the ranking v ≺i u ≺i z ≺i y ≺i x.
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Figure 1
This notion can be extended in a natural way to profiles. To illustrate this
consider the following example. Suppose a scientific community is faced with the
choice out of T = {x, y, z, u, v}, by means of 3 virtues, i, j, k and that x ≺j v ≺j
u ≺j z ≺j y and y ≺k x ≺k v ≺k u ≺k z. In the below set all profiles are close to
the profile in which v ≺i u ≺i z ≺i y ≺i x.
<vuzyx , xvuzy , yxvuz>,<vuyzx , xvuzy , yxvuz>,<vuzxy , xvuzy , yxvuz>,<vzuyx , xvuzy , yxvuz>,<uvzyx , xvuzy , yxvuz>

Figure 2
There are two different ways in which the definition of ‘closeness’ can be relaxed.
Firstly, we have so far assumed two rankings are ‘close’ if they differ in at most the
ordering of a single pair of theories. This makes more sense if the set of alternatives
is small than it does for larger sets. Consequently, in general, we may consider two
rankings as being close even if they differ in the ordering of β pairs of alternatives.
In the example presented in Fig. 1 β = 1, which meant that for any given ranking
there are four others which are close to it. But if β = 2 then this grows to include 9
more additional rankings. And if β = 10 then this corresponds to a trivial notion of
closeness in the sense that any way of ranking the alternatives is close to any other.
In general, for a set of n alternatives, the maximum value β can take is n(n−1)2 . As
before, this generalized relation of closeness can be naturally extended to deliver a
notion of closeness for profiles.
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Secondly, there is no reason why closeness between profiles be judged in reference
to only one virtue. That is, for a given profile there may be profiles which are close
to it in the sense in which they differ from the original with respect to pairwise
disagreements on multiple virtues (or one which disagrees on virtue i and another
that disagrees on virtue j). We will use α to denote the number of virtues assumed
in the definition of closeness. In the example in Fig.2, α = 1, and this delivered
four profiles. If α = 2 then there would be 20 additional profiles.
We can combine the two generalisations and obtain the notion of α-β-closeness.
As α and β grow the size of the set of profiles close to a particular profile grows as
well.5 This notion of closeness can help us model Kuhn’s idea of ambiguity.
If virtues really are ambiguous, as Kuhn suggests they are, then can the profiles
which majority voting6 maps to an intransitive relation be avoided by replacing
them with other profiles α-β-close to them? Such a move would be permissible
since, as per Kuhn, the ranking of competing theories based on scientific virtues is
not set in stone, and each virtue may be disambiguated in different ways, where
different disambiguations may result for reasons specific to each individual scientist.
The point then, is that although a scientist may have well justified (sociological or
psychological) reasons to disambiguate each virtue the way that she does, she cannot
hold each disambiguation at the same time, on pain of her favoured aggregation
function mapping to an intransitive/incomplete result. But, if she cannot hold each
disambiguation at the same time, then this provides evidence that something has
‘gone wrong’ in the way that she has disambiguated the virtues, at least when
considered together. And thus, there is nothing stopping her from revisiting them
and adopting alternative close disambiguations for (at least some) of the virtues.
It bears noting here that we are not claiming that our notion of closeness, in
terms of pairwise disagreements with the original disambiguations, is the only (or
even the best) way of thinking about ambiguity in the formal framework under con-
sideration. This (similar to our choice of focusing on pairwise majority voting) is a
modelling assumption, and it would be an interesting question to consider different
ways of capturing how a scientific virtue could be ambiguous over multiple rankings.
However, it does seem plausible that if a scientist were to be forced to revisit how
she disambiguated a certain scientific virtue in a given theory choice situation, then
adopting an alternative disambiguation that radically disagreed with her original
one would be undesirable. It could even be taken as a sign that her initial attempt
at interpreting the virtue was not sufficiently well grounded. Alternatively, the
sociological or psychological reasons that led to the original disambiguation might
be seen as having an ‘anchoring’ effect. The claim is that when faced with an in-
transitive/incomplete all-things-considered value, alternative disambiguations that
5Notice that if we increase α and β too much, i.e to α = m and β = n(n−1)
2
, then this set
collapses into the domain that profile belongs to.
6Pairwise majority voting can be defined thus: for a set of virtues V, let ∆+ =df {i ∈ V : y ≺i
x}, ∆− =df {i ∈ V : x ≺i y}. Then: y ≺ x if and only if |∆+| ≥ |∆−|. For the remainder of this
paper we will focus on pairwise majority voting and assume there is an odd number of virtues.
This means that the output of the aggregation, under pairwise majority, will always be a strict
ordering (if an ordering, at all). We use pairwise majority vote for its simplicity in illustrating our
argument. We do not thereby suggest that it be the actual aggregation function used; clearly, for
example, one may want to weight different virtues differently.
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largely agree (in terms of pairwise disagreements) with the original disambiguations
are to be preferred.
To illustrate the potential of such an approach to bypass Arrow’s impossibility
result, consider the following case: assume three virtues are used to rank three
alternatives. It is trivial that majority voting maps some profile 3-3-close to any
Condorcet-like profile7 into a transitive ranking, since any element of the domain
under consideration is 3-3-close to any other (so think of the profile in which all
virtues agree). This is not very useful as these particular large values of α and β
do not appear plausible for such a small number of theories and virtues.
Nevertheless as the number of competing theories and virtues grow, higher values
of α and β become intuitively plausible, since for more competitors and virtues, fixed
values of α and β span proportionally less of the corresponding universal domain.
A virtue faced with a large number of theories may be such that multiple pairwise
disagreements between competing disambiguations are allowed. And if there are a
larger number of virtues we may allow for more of them to be ambiguous.8 Notice
we are not suggesting replacing the troublesome profiles (those that instantiate a
Condorcet-pattern of preferences) with simply any other profile in the domain. We
want to restrain the possible replacements as much as possible, and we do so by
only looking at profiles which are α-β-close to the troublesome ones, for plausible
values of α and β.
But what precisely are plausible values? This is a difficult question to answer
in the abstract for two reasons. First, as noted above, it does seem reasonable to
assume that the plausibility of certain values of α and β depends on the number of
alternatives (n) and virtues (m) involved in the theory choice situation. Secondly,
and more importantly, even fixing the numbers n and m, whether or not particu-
lar values of α and β are plausible will still presumably depend on the particular
field of research in question, and the individual scientist doing the aggregation. A
scientist with deeply entrenched reasons for disambiguating in a way that led her
favoured aggregation function delivering an intransitive/incomplete value may well
resist considering alternative disambiguations which disagreed significantly with her
original disambiguation (thereby restricting the value of β). And she may well resist
the idea that she has to revisit a large number of the virtues she has been using to
guide her choice (thereby restricting the value of α). As such, a detailed discussion
of which α and β are plausible would require a detailed discussion of particular
theory choice scenarios, which we cannot do in this paper. Instead, we aim to offer
a proof of concept highlighting the viability of such an approach to the conceptual-
isation of scientific rationality and show that it blunts the threat raised by Okasha.
In the following section we explain how α-β-closeness can lead to a weakened notion
of rationality in the context of theory choice. And then we present some results ob-
tained by applying this relaxed notion of rationality to several simple theory choice
scenarios.
7A Condorcet profile is simply a profile that pairwise majority voting maps to an intransitive
value.
8We conjecture, that for each domain, there are minimal values of α and β such that majority
voting will succeed somewhere in each neighbourhood of profiles, and that the values of α and
β are low enough to make the rationality of theory choice nontrivial. Proving this conjecture is
beyond the scope of this paper, but is a viable avenue for future research.
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6 Weak rationality
Suppose that scientific virtues, such as simplicity, accuracy, scope, etc. do deliver
complete rankings of competing theories. Then, for any scientist, a theory choice
situation can be represented by a profile collecting all the ranking of theories ac-
cording to the individual virtues. Okasha construes the rationality of theory choice
in the following way:
Rationality Theory choice is rational only if there exists a function that respects
UD, WP, ND, IIA and that takes every profile in UD to a transitive and
complete all-things-considered ordering.
If one were to accept Okasha’s principles governing theory choice discussed in
Section 2, then Arrow’s result indeed shows that theory choice is irrational. In other
words, there is no such function that outputs a transitive and complete all-things-
considered ordering no matter what rankings the virtues supply. Using the notion
of α-β-closeness introduced in the previous section, we aim to offer a double-tier
weakening of Rationality.
Weak Rationality Theory choice is rational only if there exists a function that
respects U, WP, ND, IIA and that for at least γ profiles, takes those profiles, or
profiles α-β-close to them, into transitive and complete, all-things-considered
orderings.
Rationality and Weak Rationality differ in two respects. Firstly, whereas Ra-
tionality stipulates that the aggregation function ought to deliver a transitive and
complete all-things-considered ranking for any profile, Weak Rationality is con-
cerned only with γ profiles. For simplicity, we will express γ as a percentage of
profiles in the domain for which Weak Rationality holds. Secondly, Weak Ratio-
nality not only checks the behaviour of a function applied to a profile, but also
its behaviour applied to all profiles α-β-close to it. So, in case we try to apply
pairwise majority voting, say, to a Condorcet profile, Weak Rationality will be sat-
isfied if pairwise majority voting can deliver, for at least one profile α-β-close to
the Condorcet profile, a transitive, all-things-considered ranking. In contrast, Con-
dorcet profiles represent the counterexamples to satisfying Rationality with pairwise
majority voting.
The first weakening is motivated by the following idea. Arrow’s theorem tells us
that theory choice is not rational according to Rationality because for any function
there will be at least one profile that function will not map to a transitive and
complete all-things-considered ordering. But what if there really is a single such
profile for a particular function? Let f denote your favourite aggregation function.
There is a sense in which f would be less ‘rational’ (in an intuitive sense) if it
generated a transitive and complete all-things-considered ordering from only 1 out
of 216 profiles (the space of all profiles formed out of three virtues ranking over
three theories), than it would be if it did so from 215. If a scientist used the
function in the former case she would be acting ‘irrationally.’ But she wouldn’t
if she did so in the latter. In fact, not using f in such a scenario simply because
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of the threat posed by the single profile f fails to map to an ordering, would be
‘irrationally’ cautious. Suppose a bookie offered you a choice between two bets. the
first bet returns £100 with probability 1, the second £200 with probability .5 and
£0 otherwise. Preferring the first bet in this instance seems rational. However, as
the probability of winning £200 increases, the second bet becomes more appealing.
There seems to be a point at which preferring the first to the second bet becomes
irrationally cautious. Analogously, a scientist refraining from using f because of its
failure in only 1 out of 216 cases appears irrationally cautious. As such, rationality
can be treated as a matter of degree.
The second weakening is inspired by Kuhn’s idea that the way in which virtues
rank theories is subjective. We understand this as saying that in case a particular
profile delivers, under an aggregation function, an intransitive (or incomplete) all-
things-considered relation, moving to an α-β-close profile is permissible. We have
discussed Kuhn’s idea of ambiguity in Section 3 and the meaning of α-β-closeness in
Section 5. The issue of what values α and β should take is still beyond the scope of
this paper, but in the next section we present a proof of the viability of this proposal
for saving the rationality of theory choice, if this is construed as Weak Rationality.
7 Ambiguity to the rescue
To illustrate the viability of moving from Rationality to Weak Rationality, consider
a very simple theory choice scenario. Take α and β to be 1. That is, treat two
profiles as being close if they differ in how they rank only one pair of adjacent
theories according to a single virtue. Also take majority voting to be the method
used to aggregate the individual rankings supplied by the virtues into an all-things-
considered ranking. Then, for three virtues and three theories every Condorcet-like
profile is close to a profile for which majority voting succeeds in mapping that profile
to a transitive and complete all-things-considered ranking.
What this means is that scientists who are willing to revise the way one am-
biguous virtue ranks a pair of theories then the intransitive all-thing-considered
ranking can be avoided. Given that the values of α and β are minimal and γ=1
in this case, the theory choice among 3 theories based on 3 virtues appears to be
Weakly Rational. And pairwise majority voting is the witness of this result. The
below table documents some more values as a function of the number of theories and
virtues under consideration (note that we have not included the, plausibly common,
instance of choosing between only two competitors. As Okasha (2011, pp. 94-95),
the Arrovian result does not hold in this case).9
9These numbers were computed using Mathematica 10. Please contact the authors for a copy
of the notebooks used.
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n
3 4 5
m
3 1 .9826 .8836
5 .9907 .9375
Table 1
The columns in the above table denote the number of theories which need to
be ranked, whereas the rows denote the number of virtues according to which these
theories are assessed. Every cell contains the proportion of 1-1-close to at least one
profile that majority votes maps to a transitive ordering.
Notice that for other cases than three theories ranked according to three virtues
(so cases of more virtues or more theories) the behaviour of majority voting is not
as ‘nice’. Only .88 of the profiles comprised of 3 virtues ranking 5 theories will
be such that they are at most 1-1-close to a profile that maps to a transitive all-
things-considered ranking under majority voting. Is this value of γ good enough for
claiming that theory choice using 3 virtues to rank 5 theories is Weakly Rational?
This seems like a subjective decision inherent in theory choice and we do not wish
to argue either way. Instead, it is more fruitful to observe that the situation of
majority voting is improved if we relax the definition of closeness. The below tables
document these improvements:
3 virtues α
4 theories 1 2 3
β
1 .9826 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 1 1 1
Table 2
3 virtues α
5 theories 1 2 3
β
1 .8836 .9385 .9539
2 .9748 1 1
3 .9972 1 1
Table 3
5 virtues α
3 theories 1 2 3
β
1 .9907 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 1 1 1
Table 4
5 virtues α
4 theories 1 2 3
β
1 .9375 .9831 .9935
2 .9805 .9995 1
3 .9982 1 1
Table 5
Each table above corresponds to a cell in Table 1 except for the top left cell.
So, Table 2 corresponds to the case of three virtues ranking four theories, Table 3
three virtues ranking five theories, and so on. The columns in these tables denote
the number of ambiguous virtues considered, whereas the rows denote the number
of pairwise disagreements allowed. The numbers in the cells denote the proportion
of profiles in the appropriate domain which have at least one profile, α-β close to
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them for which majority voting delivers a transitive all-things-considered ranking.
For the case of 1 ambiguous virtue and 1 pairwise disagreement the numbers are
identical to those in Table 1. However, as we move away from that cell, γ increases
and also reaches 1 in each instance.
For a more interesting example, consider Table 3. Here we record the results
for the case in which we need to rank 5 competing theories by means of 3 scientific
virtues. Now, narrow in on the intersection between line 1 and column 2 in this
table. This cell represents the situation in which we construe two profiles as being
close if they differ in the rankings of at most 2 virtues (α = 2) and on each of these
virtues the difference between the two profiles can be in the ordering of at most
one pair of adjacent theories (β = 1). The value in this cell is .9385. This tells us
that only aprox. 6% of all profiles of 5 theories ranked by 3 virtues do not have
a 1-2-close profile for which majority voting delivers an overall transitive ranking.
Allow two profiles to be close even if they differ with respect to the ordering of two
pairs of adjacent theories, i.e. move a column to the right, and all profiles in the
space have a profile 2-2-close to them for which majority voting delivers an overall
transitive ranking.
In other words, assuming closeness is lax enough, all of the simple cases of theory
choice are such that all profiles (even the problematic ones) will have at least one
profile close to them that is mapped to a transitive all-things-considered ranking
under majority voting. And notice that this possibility result has been achieved
without trivialising the definition of closeness, i.e. for small values of α and β. For
instance, in the case of 4 theories and 3 virtues (Table 2) as well as in the case of
3 theories and 5 virtues (Table 4), this is the case for any value of α and β greater
than 1. In the case of 5 theories and 3 virtues (Table 3), an α > 1 and a β > 1 are
sufficient. The case of 4 theories and 5 virtues (Table 5) is more demanding, but
since there are also more virtues and theories, slightly higher values for α and β are
still non-trivial. Finally, even in cases in which there are still profiles which are not
close to any profiles for which pairwise majority voting delivers an overall transitive
ranking (such as Table 5, line 1), the probability of ending up with a non-transitive
profile is much lower (under any construal of closeness, i.e. any values of α and β)
than in the case in which we take virtues to be non-ambiguous.
The interpretation we assign to this result is that as long as communities of
scientists include enough subjective disagreement about how to disambiguate the
shared and objective virtues, then at least some of them will be able to rationally
aggregate the competing alternatives. And theory choice ends up being rational,
albeit weakly so.
8 Conclusion
Okasha (2011) aims to prove that the situation of theory choice, if we are to con-
strue it in Kuhnian terms, is even worse than Kuhn anticipated. It is not the case
the objective elements of theory choice alone do not supply an unique algorithm for
arriving at an all-things-considered ranking of theories, but rather they supply no
such algorithm at all. This poses a threat to the objectivity of theory choice. In
this paper we argue that Kuhn’s ideas regarding the subjectivity of the rankings
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generated by the ambiguous virtues offer a solution to Okasha’s challenge. Taking
the ambiguity of scientific virtues seriously, what Okasha shows is that across the
universal domain, regardless of the function used, it is not the case that every disam-
biguation will yield a rational choice. But he doesn’t show that no disambigutation
will do this. We investigate some simple cases of theory choice and prove that ra-
tional aggregation is possible as long as the definition of ambiguity is sufficiently
relaxed and more virtues are treated as being ambiguous. It therefore seems that
the considerable effectiveness of scientific virtues depends on them being sufficiently
unarticulated.
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